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AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER  
 
Peter D. Trooboff
*
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In her recent New York Times column, Gail Collins addressed 
Republican criticism of President Obama’s approach to foreign policy:  
Mitt [Romney] told a conservative radio host [Hugh Hewitt] 
this week that the President is weak because of “his 
fundamental disbelief in American exceptionalism.”  This is 
part of a widespread Republican theory that simply believing 
that our country is a great and unique nation is not good 
enough unless you also run around the world publicly 
pointing out to our allies that we are way, way better than 
they are.
1
    
Ms. Collins goes on to refer sarcastically to Mr. Romney’s criticism of 
President Obama’s “nuanced” diplomacy given that most diplomatic 
exchanges require at least a nuanced approach.   
While President Obama was almost certainly not even thinking about 
Mr. Romney’s remarks, I thought that the President responded rather well to 
this criticism in his speech at the National Defense University concerning, 
among other matters, the United States’ role in Libya.2 Whatever one might 
say about the merits of the decision concerning Libya, the President set out 
                                                 
*
 Senior Counsel, Covington & Burling LLP. Peter Trooboff has practiced in the area 
of international trade and investment for over forty years.  He won a Theberge award for 
private international law in 2010 and was the president of the American Society of 
International Law from 1990 to 1992. He has supervised numerous investigations into U.S. 
foreign trade control violations by international corporations and is often involved in 
international arbitral proceedings.  
This Essay is based on the author’s remarks at the symposium on “Challenges to 
International Law, Challenges from International Law: New Realities and the Global 
Order,” held at the St. John’s University School of Law, April 1, 2011.  
1
 Gail Collins, Op-Ed., What’s in a Nickname?, N.Y. TIMES, March 26, 2011, at A21. 
The comment by Mr. Romney to Mr. Hewitt was: “I think it’s fair to ask, you know, what 
is it that explains the absence of any discernible foreign policy from the president of the 
United States? And I believe that it flows from his fundamental disbelief in American 
exceptionalism. In the President’s world, all nations have common interests, the lines 
between good and evil are blurred, America’s history merits apology.  And without a 
compass to guide him in our increasingly turbulent world, he’s tentative, indecisive, timid 
and nuanced.” 
2
 See Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya, DAILY COMP. 
PRESS DOCS, 2011 DCPD No. 00206 (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya. 
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a useful framework for the range of American responses to calls for United 
States intervention.  He discussed those cases where, as he submitted was 
the situation in Libya, the safety of our country is not at risk but “our 
interests and values are.”3  He calls these threats to “our common humanity 
and our common security” and makes clear that they can arise from natural 
or man-made disasters.
4
  The President added, “In such cases, we should not 
be afraid to act – but the burden of action should not be America’s alone.”5  
He continued, 
Real leadership creates the conditions and coalitions for 
others to step up as well; to work with allies and partners so 
that they bear their share of the burden and pay their share of 
the costs; and to see that the principles of justice and human 
dignity are upheld by all.
6
 
This unintentional point and counterpoint between the President and Mr. 
Romney, which likely foreshadows the 2012 campaign regardless of who 
might be the Republican candidate, highlights what has been said during 
this conference.  I listened to the discussions of international economic 
regulation and thought it was a very good panel.  I was reminded of an 
excellent book that is not referenced sufficiently by the late Abram Chayes 
and his wife Antonia Handler Chayes titled The New Sovereignty: 
Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements.
7
  If you have not 
looked at this book, you should because it develops a theme with which I 
strongly identify.  Abe and Toni Chayes demonstrate that there is a great 
deal that we take for granted in the way the global economic system works.  
Further, the system works because we are participating with others in 
regimes that regulate, that control and that govern.  The two professors 
elaborate upon a long list of such regimes in the book and illustrate their 
point well.  They reinforce what the President said in his speech on Libya. 
We have not always been immediately successful in our attempts to lead 
on issues in the international regulatory field.  I think of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act.
8
  When we enacted that legislation in the 1970s, we were 
regarded by most of our allies as not only naive but unrealistic.
9
  As one 
                                                 
3
 See id. 
4
 See id. 
5
 See id.  
6
 See id.  
7
 See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).  
8
  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq. (2011). 
9
 See Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 238, 261 (1997) (explaining 
that it is unrealistic to expect the world to embrace this “hard-line legislation,” and that 
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client put it to me, although his words may have been a little more carefully 
chosen, “How can you expect this stuff to stop and how can we compete 
without doing it?”  Today we have the United Nations Convention on 
Corruption that the U.N. General Assembly approved in October 2003,
10
 
and other nations have begun to adopt laws that parallel our own.
11
  Further, 
Transparency International has become a global organization sponsored by 
civil society that promotes anti-corruption policies and legislation.
12
 In 
short, sometimes American exceptionalism leads to our getting ahead of 
ourselves, but we do it in ways and for reasons that are good.  At the end of 
the day if our ideas are right and well-articulated, other nations will come 
along and see that we were on the right track.   
While I am not an expert in the field of human rights, the discussion of 
free speech today makes me think of an area that is not on the front pages 
but on which I have done a fair amount of work.  I refer to a series of 
American cases that have refused to enforce judgments from other countries 
that offend our notions of free speech.
13
  In response to this concern, we 
now have the Libel Terrorism Act in New York
14
 and a Federal Libel 
Terrorism Act.
15
  We also had a good deal of debate within the American 
Law Institute about when the United States should refuse to enforce a 
                                                                                                                            
violations are inevitable because of these unrealistic expectations); see also Steven R. 
Salbu, A Delicate Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change, and Transnational Bribery, 
33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 657, 678–79 (2000) (stating that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
has been considered ineffective because it is naïve to address corruption through legislation 
if the corruption is rooted in institutional foundations). 
10
 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption, Background of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (Dec. 4, 
2008), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html.  
11
 See Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, 1998 S.C., ch. 34 (Can.); see also 
Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (Eng.).   
12
 See Transparency International, About Us, http://www.transparency.org/about_us 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2012) (describing that Transparency International is an anti-corruption 
NGO). 
13
 See Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 250–51 (Md. 1997) (finding that 
English libel judgment would be repugnant to the public policy of Maryland because the 
principles governing defamation actions under English law were so contrary to Maryland 
defamation law and to the policy of freedom of the press); see also Bachchan v. India 
Abroad Publ’ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (denying the enforcement of a 
British libel judgment under New York law because the judgment was not issued with the 
protections for free speech required by the U.S. and New York Constitutions); see also 
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 
1189 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding unenforceable a French judgment requiring a service 
provider to remove Nazi-related items from its website), rev’d on other grounds, 433 F.3d 
1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
14
 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(d), 5304(b)(8) (McKinney 2009). 
15
 Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act 
(SPEECH Act), 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101–4105 (2010). 
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judgment that infringes free speech protected under our Constitution.
16
  
There seems to be little dispute about refusing to enforce when an American 
citizen or resident or someone publishing in this country is the defendant.  
That is generally the focus of the libel terrorism legislation.  But what 
happens when two non-U.S. parties have a dispute abroad about a published 
account and the libel judgment is based on concepts of free speech that do 
not comport with our Constitutional norms?  Many of us believe that the 
United States should also refuse to enforce those judgments as well, and 
there are court decisions that lean in that direction.
17
  So, we do see the 
exceptional notions of free speech, embodied in our Constitution, having an 
influence over a subject that we do not think about in that context, namely 
judgments enforcement, and reacting to the rulings of courts enforcing the 
laws of other nations. 
I find myself in a rather curious position when I turn to the issues 
relating to the use of force that have arisen during today’s discussion.  On 
the one hand, we meet while the United States is playing an active role to 
support the rebel anti-Gaddafi forces in Libya.
18
  At this time – and even in 
                                                 
16
 See Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge for the ALI: 
Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an International Treaty, and an American Statute, 
75 IND. L.J. 635, 635, 644 (2000) (discussing the project undertaken by the American Law 
Institute to draft a federal statute concerning the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
country judgments, including whether to enforce a judgment that infringes on free speech 
that is protected under the U.S. Constitution); see also Rochelle Dreyfuss, The ALI 
Principles on Transnational Intellectual Property Disputes: Why Invite Conflicts?, 30 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 819, 826–27 (2005) (establishing that the ALI principles on 
transnational intellectual property disputes set out rules on when, and on what terms, 
judgments based on these bases of jurisdiction should be enforced). 
17
 See Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 274, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (holding unenforceable as contrary to the First Amendment a French damage 
judgment based on photographs posted on the Internet and freely accessible to American 
viewers); see also Motré D. Carodine, Political Judging: When Due Process Goes 
International, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1245 (2007) (arguing that the state action 
doctrine precludes enforcement of some foreign libel judgments); see also Timothy Zick, 
Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free Speech at—and Beyond—our Borders, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1586 (2010) (claiming that U.S. courts have generally refused 
to enforce foreign libel judgments because they are contrary to the First Amendment and to 
public policy). 
18
 See Mark Hosenball, Exclusive: Obama Authorizes Secret Help for Libya Rebels, 
REUTERS, Mar. 30, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/30/us-libya-usa-order-
idUSTRE72T6H220110330 (declaring that President Barack Obama authorized covert 
U.S. government support for opponents of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi); see also 
AFP, US Launches Anti-Gaddafi Africa Offensive, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 10, 
2011, available at http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/us-launches-antigaddafi-
africa-offensive-20110810-1impz.html (claiming that while the U.S. engaged in air strikes 
against Libya, American diplomats visited several African countries to support ousting 
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the late summer of 2011 when these remarks are being polished – we are 
unsure how the Libyan civil war – let’s call it what it is – will end.   
At the same time, for the past several months my law firm has, as a 
matter of public record been pro-bono counsel to President Alassane 
Ouattara in Côte d’Ivoire.  I have been part of a team that has been working 
on this assignment to cause former President Gbagbo to leave the 
Presidential Palace and turn over power to the candidate who won the 
election.  Without any use of outside force, we see that the world 
community’s support of President Ouattara has led to a successful 
outcome.
19
   In this situation the international community acted most 
effectively through regional organizations including the Organization of 
African Union and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) in defense of the properly elected president.
20
  Over time the 
international community persuaded some reluctant states that they were on 
the wrong side of history if they continued to support a president who had 
lost an election.   
Unfortunately, the successful outcome for President Ouattara did not 
occur without some internal strife.  As many as 3,000 citizens were killed in 
the course of the fighting that led to President Ouattara’s final success and 
perhaps as many one million citizens were displaced.
21
  Indeed, when he 
met with President Ouattara in Washington in July 2011, President Obama 
referred to this loss of life and called for steps toward reconciliation.
22
  He 
said that those responsible for atrocities should be held accountable. 
23
 
To be clear, our law firm was not responsible for President Ouattara’s 
rightful assumption of office in Côte d’Ivoire.  Our limited role was to help 
                                                                                                                            
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi). 
19
 See CNN Wire Staff, Ivory Coast President Urges Calm After Gbagbo is Arrested, 
CNN, Apr. 11, 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/04/11/ivory.coast. 
crisis/?hpt=T2 (noting that the United Nation was not involved in extracting former 
President Laurent Gbagbo from his power, and that U.S. President Barack Obama and 
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton supported President Alassane Outtara); see also World 
Leaders Back Ouattara as Ivory Coast Poll Winner, BBC, Dec. 4, 2010, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/04/11/ivory.coast.crisis/?hpt=T2 (maintaining 
that Alassane Outtara is recognized internationally as President of the Ivory Coast). 
20
 See Ivory Coast: Laurent Gbagbo maintains Ouattara Blockage, BBC, Jan. 5, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12120149 (asserting the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) has threatened to force out former President Laurent 
Gbagbo from his power if mediation efforts fail). 
21
See Ivory Coast: Laurent Gbagbo Standoff, GUARDIAN, Apr. 11, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2011/apr/06/ivory-coast-laurent-gbagbo-live/.  
22
See Adam Nossiter, In West Africa, Some Heroes of the Ballot Box Have a Tenuous 
Grip on Power, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 30, 2011, at A8 (noting that President Obama hosted a 
meeting in Washington with “four recently elected West African presidents in support for 
the continent’s nascent democracies”). 
23
 Id. 
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with the legal issues, to explain why Mr. Ouattara, a distinguished former 
IMF senior executive, was elected by a 10 percent margin in an election that 
had been negotiated as to its procedures for five years.
24
  The only reason 
President Gbagbo would not leave office was because he did not like the 
electoral results.
25
  The former president acted extra-legally by having a 
constitutional commission act without authority to throw out 600,000 votes 
which became the margin of his victory.
26
 With some encouragement, all 
the major international banks closed down their affiliates in the country.
27
  
Cocoa exports started to stop.
28
  President Ouattara issued a decree warning 
third-country nationals or companies that they could not extinguish debts 
owed to the government, like taxes or other export fees, by paying 
Gbagbo’s unelected officials.29  We became involved in that because it 
seemed to us that nothing disciplines the mind as general counsel as much 
as the notion that his or her company may have to pay taxes or other 
governmental fees twice.  In short, we played a supporting role for a worthy 
                                                 
24
 See Scott Baldauf, Ivory Coast Violence Escalates as Mediation Efforts Stall, 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 28, 2011, available at, http://www.csmonitor.com 
/World/Africa/2011/0228/Ivory-Coast-violence-escalates-as-mediation-efforts-stall; see 
also Adam Nossiter, Outcome Uncertain in Ivory Coast Election, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 
2010, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/world/africa/02 ivory.html.  
25
See Kurtis Lee, Democracy Threatened by Election Stand-off in Ivory Coast, PBS 
NEWS HOUR EXTRA, Jan. 4, 2010, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/world/jan-
june11/ivorycoast_1-04.html. 
26
See Official: AU backs Ouatarra as Ivory Coast Leader, USA TODAY, Mar. 10, 
2011, http://www.usatoday.com /news/world/2011-03-10-au-ivory-coast_N.htm. 
27
 See Ivory Coast Crisis Intensifies as Largest Bank Shuts its Doors, THE GUARDIAN, 
Feb. 17, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/17/ivory-coast-banks-shut-
gbagbo-protest; see also Marco Chown Oved, Ivory Coast's Gbagbo Seizes 4 International 
Banks, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 18, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Business /wireStory? 
id=12950365. 
28
 See Call for Cocoa Export Ban in Ivory Coast, EURO NEWS, Jan 24, 2011, available 
at http://www.euronews.net/2011/01/24/call-for-cocoa-export-ban-in-ivory-coast/ (stating 
that Ouattara implemented a cocoa ban to place pressure on current President Gbagbo); see 
also Cocoa Price Climbs After Ouattara Calls for Export Ban, RADIO FRANCE 
INTERNATIONALE, Jan 24, 2011, http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20110124-cocoa-price-
climbs-after-ouattara-calls-export-ban (explaining that the cocoa ban resulted in rising 
cocoa prices). 
29
 See Pauline Bax & Olivier Monnier, Ivory Coast's Ouattara Calls for Halt of Tax 
Payments During Bank Closure, BLOOMBERG, Jan 31, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2011-01-31/ivory-coast-s-ouattara-calls-for-halt-of-tax-payments-during-bank-
closure. html (indicating that Ouattara told citizens to stop paying their taxes); see also Tim 
Cocks, Ivory Coast Cocoa Ban Stays Until March 31: Ouattara, REUTERS AFRICA, Mar. 
15, 2011, http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE72E01G20110315 (explaining that 
Ouattra warned exporters that they face sanctions when he comes to power if they 
cooperate with Gbagbo’s government by continuing to pay taxes). 
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Michael Mattler made an extremely important point about how much 
more difficult it is sometimes for the United States to participate in global 
regimes and international treaties.  He used the example of land mines.  It is 
well to recall that sometimes we make matters harder for ourselves.  I have 
recently been involved in cluster munitions, which, in brief, are perfectly 
legitimate weapon if properly deployed.  If you want to stop tanks in Korea, 
and if you wanted to stop the tanks from the Soviet Union crossing from 
Eastern Europe, when the Soviet Union was still operational, you needed 
cluster munitions.  Then the question becomes which cluster munitions are 
acceptable and which are not, and how should they be used?  That gets very 
complicated.  The interesting point is that the United States was in 
negotiations over these questions in Geneva in an effort to draft a protocol 
to the 1989 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May Be Deemed To Be 
Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects.
30
 There came a 
time when the U.N. member states thought that it was taking too much time 
to agree on such a protocol and that prospects for resolving the hardest 
issues were not good.  As a result, the government of Norway convened a 
separate diplomatic conference in Oslo to reach agreement for a distinct 
Convention on Cluster Munitions of May 2008, which now has 59 
ratifications and 50 signatories.
31
  
The United States – i.e., the State Department of George W. Bush –
decided not to participate in the Oslo negotiations that led to the Cluster 
Munitions Convention.
32
  This meant that not only was American expertise 
not reflected in the Convention, but it had had other serious consequences 
as well.  For example, provisions were written into the Oslo Convention 
that, when fully understood, are intended to prejudice American 
manufacturers of cluster munitions and to advantage European 
                                                 
30
 See The United Nations Office at Geneva, The United Nations in the Heart of 
Europe: Disarmament, Dec. 21, 2001, http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/% 
28httpPages% 29/4F0DEF093B4860B4C1257180004B1B30 (describing the provisions of 
the convention on certain conventional weapons).  
31
 See The Convention on Cluster Munitions, CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS: 
TO END THE HARM CAUSED BY CLUSTER MUNITIONS, http://www.clusterconvention.org/ 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2011) (exploring the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which was 
created to minimize the use of injurious weapons). 
32
 See David Houska, Cluster Munitions at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/clusterataglance (mentioning that the United States 
has not come to a conclusion as to where their Cluster Munitions negotiations will lead); 
see also The Oslo Process, LANDMINE ACTION: CONTROLLING THE TECHNOLOGY OF 
VIOLENCE, http://landmineaction.org/issues/page.asp?PLID=1012&page ID=1038 (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2011) (noting the nations that signed the Convention in Oslo).   
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manufacturers.
33
 This experience again illustrates that, for the United States, 
engagement in international negotiations is sometime difficult and even 
unpleasant, but often the only course of action that will ultimately serve 
United States interests.   
I had wanted to provide yet a different illustration concerning the 
difficulty because of federal-state issues of formulating implementing 
legislation for the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.  
Unfortunately, there was not time to do so during the Symposium.  Suffice 
to say for this record that the Supreme Court’s decision concerning self-
executing treaties in Medellín v. Texas
34
 and the growing states’ rights 
perspective in our political life
35
 mean that implementing international 
agreements will become increasingly difficult in the years ahead.  As a 
result, the United States and its delegations to preparatory sessions and 
diplomatic conferences on new treaties concerning almost any subject will 
need to consider the internal implementation issue from the outset – not 
after the agreement is completed. 
Finally, the various meanings of exceptionalism can include 
unilateralism, which generally does not work for the United States when 
there are viable and potentially successful alternatives.  It almost always 
fails in the international regulatory area.  I speak as one who was heavily 
involved in litigation over the Soviet pipeline, and who has spent over 30 
years advising major U.S. and overseas companies with U.S. export 
controls and economic sanctions.  In the regulatory world, especially on 
subjects such as export controls and economic sanctions, the United States 
is generally much better off working out something with our allies that will 
be generally accepted even if the agreed regime is initially less forceful than 
what we would have liked.  That is one of the most important lessons from 
our experience with sanctions against Iran and with those against terrorists 
and terrorist organizations. 
 
 
                                                 
33
 See M. Codner and E. Quintana, Beyond the Convention: The Cluster Munitions 
Debate, 155 RUSI J. 56, 58 (2010). 
34
 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
35
 See ASSESSING THE GEORGE W. BUSH PRESIDENCY 71 (Andrew Wroe & Jon Herbert 
eds., 2009) (noting that the Bush administration continued to defend states’ rights); see also 
WILLIAM EARL MAXWELL ET AL., TEXAS POLITICS TODAY 66 (2010) (showing the 
influence that Medellin v. Texas had on increasing states’ rights). 
 
